Criminal Should Never Trust Another Criminal
Arson is a serious crime that often injures or kills the innocent. Whether set to defraud an insurer or just for spite it cannot be allowed to succeed without serious punishment. When committing a serious crime like arson it is best to have no co-conspirators or witnesses. They must remember that there is no honor among thieves. Amanda Azevedo found out why when statements made by her co-conspirator to police officers and in deposition at a civil trial guaranteed the conviction of Azevedo.
In Connecticut, the Court of Appeal was called upon to reverse Azevedo’s conviction in State of Connecticut v. Amanda Azevedo, AC 38124, Court Of Appeals Of The State Of Connecticut (December 19, 2017).
Azevedo was convicted of the crimes of arson in the first degree, attempt to commit insurance fraud, attempt to commit larceny in the first degree, conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree, conspiracy to commit insurance fraud and conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree in connection with an arson that destroyed her home, the defendant appealed. She claimed that certain out-of-court statements that D, her coconspirator, had made to an insurance company fire investigator and to two police officers, and certain testimony that D had given in a deposition in a related civil action, should not have been admitted into evidence because they constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated her sixth amendment right to confrontation.
D had told the investigator about the defendant’s actions and whereabouts on the morning of the fire, and testified similarly in the deposition. After a memorial service for the defendant’s late husband, D asked to speak to the police officers privately and told them that the defendant was responsible for setting her house on fire and how she set the fire, that he was present while items were being removed from the defendant’s home prior to the fire and that there was a video of the items being removed. The trial court determined, on the basis of D’s deposition testimony and statements to the investigator, that the state had established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a conspiracy between D and the defendant, and, therefore, that D’s deposition testimony and statements to the investigator were admissible under the Connecticut Code of Evidence as statements of a coconspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy. The trial court further determined that D’s statements to the police officers inculpated both himself and the defendant, and, thus, were admissible as dual inculpatory statements.
The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence D’s deposition testimony and statements to the investigator as statements of a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy: although that court admitted D’s statements and deposition testimony for their substantive use, the statements were not admitted to prove their contents but, rather, were admitted as verbal acts in furtherance of a conspiracy, and, therefore, because the statements and testimony were not testimonial in nature, the defendant’s right of confrontation was not implicated; moreover, in light of the extrinsic evidence of the conspiracy presented by the state, which included evidence of discrepancies concerning the defendant’s activities and whereabouts on the morning of the fire, and showing D’s presence at the defendant’s home days prior to the fire when the defendant’s belongings were removed from the home and that D wanted the defendant’s husband to receive the insurance proceeds from the fire, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that the state had proven the existence of a conspiracy between D and the defendant by a fair preponderance of the evidence so as to permit the jury to consider D’s deposition testimony and statements as evidence of the continuing conspiracy.
The trial court properly characterized D’s statements to the police officers as dual inculpatory statements. D’s statements to the police officers reasonably could be characterized as inculpating both himself and the defendant, as D reasonably understood that his statements were against his penal interest in that they implicated him in the conspiracy to commit insurance fraud. D was unavailable to testify at the defendant’s trial in that he would have invoked his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination had he been called to testify, and his statements presented sufficient indicia of reliability; moreover, given the substantial amount of admissible evidence adduced at trial that supported the defendant’s conviction, any possible error in the court’s admission of D’s statements to the officers as dual inculpatory statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Connecticut, an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay. . . . If such a statement is offered for a purpose other than establishing the truth of the matters contained in the statement, it is not hearsay.” The defendant contends that the court admitted D’s
The defendant bears the responsibility of demonstrating that his claim is indeed a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. She failed.
Azevedo made two serious errors: She attempted an arson for profit without the knowledge or skill to do the crime carefully; and she trusted a co-conspirator who divulged the scheme to the police, an insurance investigator and in a civil deposition. The evidence from the co-conspirator was not presented as evidence of the crime or to prove the truth of the matter asserted but was, rather presented, as an admission of the crime by the co-conspirator which allowed the jury to understand how Azevedo was responsible for the crime. Thanks to a wise Connecticut court she will stay in jail.
© 2017 – Barry Zalma
This article, and all of the blog posts on this site, digests and summarizes cases published by courts of the various states and the United States. The court decisions have been modified from the actual language of the court decisions, were condensed for ease of reading, and convey the opinions of the author regarding each case.
Barry Zalma, Esq., CFE, now limits his practice to service as an insurance consultant specializing in insurance coverage, insurance claims handling, insurance bad faith and insurance fraud almost equally for insurers and policyholders. He also serves as an arbitrator or mediator for insurance related disputes. He practiced law in California for more than 44 years as an insurance coverage and claims handling lawyer and more than 50 years in the insurance business. He is available at http://www.zalma.com and email@example.com.
Mr. Zalma is the first recipient of the first annual Claims Magazine/ACE Legend Award.
Look to National Underwriter Company for the new Zalma Insurance Claims Library, at www.nationalunderwriter.com/ZalmaLibrary The new books are Insurance Law, Mold Claims Coverage Guide, Construction Defects Coverage Guide and Insurance Claims: A Comprehensive Guide The American Bar Association, Tort & Insurance Practice Section has published Mr. Zalma’s book “The Insurance Fraud Deskbook” available at http://shop.americanbar.org/eBus/Store/ProductDetails.aspx?productId=214624, or 800-285-2221 which is presently available and “Diminution of Value Damages” available at http://shop.americanbar.org/eBus/Store/ProductDetails.aspx?productId=203226972 Mr. Zalma’s three new e-books were recently added and are available at http://zalma.com/zalma-books/
The author and publisher disclaim any liability, loss, or risk incurred as a consequence, directly or indirectly, of the use and application of any of the contents of this blog. The information provided is not a substitute for the advice of a competent insurance, legal, or other professional. The Information provided at this site should not be relied on as legal advice. Legal advice cannot be given without full consideration of all relevant information relating to an individual situation.